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Political Constraints on Supreme Court 
Reform 
Adrian Vermeule† 
Many proposals to reform the rules of the Supreme Court 
game are currently under discussion.1 Which of these proposals 
lie within the politically feasible set, and which are ruled out by 
political constraints? In what follows, I will sketch the shape of 
those constraints and describe the main political mechanisms 
that produce them. I use the failure of Roosevelt’s court-
packing plan in 1937 as a running example, supplemented by 
comparisons with the flurry of reform plans—mostly unsuccess-
ful—offered during Reconstruction. The main thesis is that re-
form of the Court requires political conditions that have a self-
negating tendency. The very conditions that produce demand 
for structural reform of the Court also tend to produce counter-
forces that block the movement for reform. The point is not of 
course that structural reform is impossible, in the sense that it 
is always ruled out by political constraints. In particular cases, 
the demand for reform may be just strong enough, and the 
counterforces produced by that demand just weak enough, that 
a reform proposal can slip through. Yet reform cannot be pre-
dicted in advance or relied upon; it is systematically unlikely to 
occur. The stronger the movement for reform, the higher the 
obstacles that must be surmounted. 
 
 
†  Bernard D. Meltzer Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Thanks 
to Dennis Hutchinson, Gerry Rosenberg, Adam Samaha, Fred Schauer, Cass 
Sunstein, and Mark Tushnet for helpful comments and conversations. Thanks 
to Sean Heikkila for helpful research assistance. The Russell J. Parsons Fac-
ulty Research Fund provided generous support. 
 1. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, The Supreme Court 
Renewal Act: A Return to Basic Principles, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM 
LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 467 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Car-
rington eds., 2006). 
VERMEULE_3FMT 05/17/2006 09:21:16 AM 
2006] POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON REFORM 1155 
 
My principal interest is in detailing the mechanisms that 
produce political constraints on Supreme Court reform, regard-
less of how tight those constraints turn out to be. However, I 
will also suggest, without attempting to provide systematic evi-
dence, that the constraints are in fact quite restrictive. The ash 
heap of history is piled high with reform proposals that have 
attracted no supporters (other than those who formulated 
them), attracted academic supporters but no political backers, 
or attracted political backers but no popular following. Almost 
all ideas for Supreme Court reform die in committee, literally 
or metaphorically. The constitutional and statutory rules gov-
erning the Court—the number of its members, their terms of 
tenure, the voting and quorum rules that govern their actions, 
and so on—have in most cases remained unchanged, at least 
since Reconstruction, and in some cases since the first Judici-
ary Act of 1789.2 Not everything has held constant—the switch 
to discretionary certiorari jurisdiction in 1925 is a salient ex-
ample3—but in the broad, structural reform of the Court is ex-
ceedingly rare. All else equal, the higher the stakes of a reform 
proposal, the more opposition it will generate and the less 
likely it is to succeed. The reform proposals that do succeed, 
conversely, are likely to be of marginal importance, at least 
when compared to the ambitious model of the court-packing 
plan. 
Part I defines “reform” as structural change in the consti-
tutional and statutory rules that govern the Supreme Court 
game, as opposed to substitution of new players for old ones 
(through appointments) or new behavior by old players under 
the old rules (a “switch in time”). Parts II through V turn to the 
mechanisms that constrain reform by provoking counterforces 
to the reform movement. Although some of these mechanisms 
apply to institutional reform generally, some apply only to re-
form of the Court. Court reform both partakes in the general 
difficulty of institutional reform and presents additional diffi-
culties of its own. 
Part II discusses the problem of multidimensional politics. 
The large, national coalitions necessary for Supreme Court re-
form will typically be assembled on other issue dimensions and 
will fracture when judicial reform comes to the fore. Part III 
 
 2. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
 3. See Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: 
The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (2006). 
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considers the problem of the optimal majority. Reform move-
ments must steer between Scylla and Charybdis: a majority 
that is too small will be blocked at the vetogates of the legisla-
tive process, while a majority that is too large will provoke a 
backlash spurred by fears of tyranny. Part IV discusses the ba-
sic trade-off between impartiality and motivation. Structural 
reforms adopted behind a veil of uncertainty will be and seem 
impartial, but in general, no politically influential group will be 
motivated to support them. Conversely, proposals that produce 
short-term benefits for particular groups will attract motivated 
supporters but will also provoke opposition. Part V suggests 
that political crisis is both a precondition for and an obstacle to 
reform of the Court. In a brief conclusion, I consider the rele-
vance of political constraints from the standpoints of both ana-
lysts and advocates of reform. Although analysts should con-
sider political constraints, advocates of reform should not. 
I.  “REFORM” 
We may define reform both by reference to paradigm cases 
and at the conceptual level. I will take as the paradigm of re-
form Roosevelt’s 1937 court-packing bill. So far as relevant 
here, the proposal would have added one Justice, up to a total 
membership of fifteen, for each Justice over the age of 70 who 
had served ten years and who did not retire within six months 
of his 70th birthday.4 Roosevelt had carried forty-eight states in 
the 1936 election and commanded filibuster-proof majorities in 
both the House and Senate (although we will see that the De-
mocratic coalition would fracture along the fault line of Su-
preme Court reform).5 My main thesis about the episode will be 
that the very conditions that produced such obvious potential 
for reforming the Court also produced the political constraints 
that blocked reform. 
At the conceptual level, I will generalize from the court-
packing example to stipulate that “reform” means a proposal 
for change in the rules of the Supreme Court game. This defini-
tion makes reform synonymous with structural reform, includ-
ing the number of Justices, their tenure, voting rules, and so 
forth. It excludes both (1) a substitution of new players for old  
 
 
 4. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 134 (1995). 
 5. Id. at 158–59. 
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players through the appointments process and (2) a change in 
the actions that the old players take under the old rules. 
This definition has the consequence that the indirect ef-
fects of the court-packing plan did not produce reform in the 
structural sense I have indicated. Roosevelt eventually ob-
tained no less than seven Supreme Court appointments, pro-
ducing a cadre of like-minded Justices.6 For reasons discussed 
below, however, this does not count as reform. Furthermore, if 
the selection of new players does not count, a change in the be-
havior of the old players does not count either. Suppose that 
the threat of court packing—or the anticipation of some threat 
of that kind—produced a “switch in time,” in which Justice 
Roberts changed his vote to uphold politically controversial 
economic and social legislation.7 (Here, I am bracketing a set of 
historical controversies over whether there was any such 
switch and whether, if there was, it was caused by the court-
packing plan).8 This change in the actions taken by old Justices 
under the old rules is not structural reform; it is tacking with 
the prevailing political winds. Besides the court-packing plan, 
another example involves the proposal, floated during both Re-
construction and the New Deal, to require a two-thirds vote of 
the Justices to invalidate legislation on constitutional grounds.9 
During Reconstruction, the proposal lacked a critical mass of 
support, in part because the Court ducked many of the central 
constitutional issues posed by Reconstruction legislation and 
thus vented away the growing pressure for reform.10 
 
 
 6. See id. at 220. 
 7. For a discussion on the “switch in time,” see generally id. at 142–47. 
 8. On the question whether a switch in time occurred, see BARRY CUSH-
MAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITU-
TIONAL REVOLUTION 45–105 (1998); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION 
AND THE NEW DEAL 11–163 (2000). Another view is that there was a switch, 
but it predated the court-packing plan and was caused by the Justices’ antici-
pation of a threat of constitutional amendment following the 1936 election. See 
Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, The Political Economy of Supreme Court Con-
stitutional Decisions: The Case of Roosevelt’s Court-Packing Plan, 12 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 45, 53–65 (1992). Presumably, one might also hypothesize 
that the switch predated the court-packing plan but was caused by the Jus-
tices’ anticipation of that plan or another plan with similar effects. 
 9. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: 
THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 307 & n.144 (1985); David E. Kyvig, The Road 
Not Taken: FDR, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Amendment, 104 
POL. SCI. Q. 463, 470–71 (1989). 
 10. See CURRIE, supra note 9, at 307 & n.144. 
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Why define reform so narrowly? If Roosevelt obtained 
much of what he wanted through the switch in time and 
through appointments, why classify the court-packing plan as a 
failure? Roosevelt himself said that although he lost the court-
packing battle, he won the broader war.11 From an even 
broader perspective, however, the problem is that changes not 
amounting to structural reform are only a temporary palliative. 
As long as the rules themselves remain unchanged, later peri-
ods can see a recurrence of the problems that motivated reform 
in the first place. Even if the outcome of the court-packing fight 
was good for Roosevelt or the New Deal in the short run,12 it 
may have been bad for the polity in the long run. 
This point holds whether one considers the actual aim of 
the court-packing plan or its nominal aim. Below, I will discuss 
the divergence between the plan’s actual aim and its nominal 
aim, which produced the contemporary perception that the plan 
was a thinly disguised ploy for packing the Court with ideologi-
cally compatible Justices. As for the actual aim of the court-
packing plan—clearing away judicial obstruction to New Deal 
policies—some of Roosevelt’s advisers “argued that Justices 
who could switch so easily in his favor could just as easily jump 
back once the pressure was off.”13 Although no such switch 
back took place in the period, the advisers were right in a lar-
ger time frame. The absence of a formal New Deal amendment 
to the Constitution permits or at least encourages the Court to 
flirt with retro-restrictive interpretations of the Commerce 
Clause, in line with a broader originalist movement that some 
say aims to reinstate the pre-1937 “Constitution in Exile.”14 As 
for the nominal goal of the court-packing plan—reducing the 
fraction of Justices whose sell-by date has passed—the direct 
effect of the Roosevelt plan would have been to place a struc-
tural cap on the fraction of the Court’s membership that was 70  
 
 
 11. See Kyvig, supra note 9, at 466. 
 12. For discussion and references on whether the outcome of the fight was 
in Roosevelt’s interests (short-term or long-term), see generally Jamie L. Car-
son & Benjamin A. Kleinerman, A Switch in Time Saves Nine: Institutions, 
Strategic Actors, and FDR’s Court-Packing Plan, 113 PUB. CHOICE 301 (2002). 
 13. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 4, at 144. 
 14. This phrase stems from Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running 
Riot, 18 REGULATION 83, 84 (1995). For debate about whether any such “Con-
stitution in Exile” movement even exists, see Cass Sunstein & Randy Barnett, 
Constitution In Exile?, LEGAL AFF., May 2, 2005, http://www.legalaffairs 
.org/webexclusive/dc_printerfriendly.msp?id=41. 
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years old or more, an issue that has arisen again in recent 
years.15 
The narrow definition of reform makes clear the first sense 
in which Supreme Court reform tends to be a self-negating en-
terprise. The conditions that produce a real threat of reform 
will also, for the same reasons, tend to produce a switch in time 
that reduces the demand for reform. The threat of reform tight-
ens the political constraints on the Justices, but a switch in 
time can buy off the threat. Of course, if it is clear ex ante that 
reform will be blocked by political constraints, then the threat 
of reform is not credible from the Justices’ standpoint. From the 
standpoint of reformers, however, the Justices’ ability to tack 
as the winds set against them is itself another political con-
straint on reform. The judicial volte-face saps the political de-
mand for structural change. 
II.  THE PROBLEM OF MULTIDIMENSIONAL POLITICS 
I begin in this section with the well-known problem that 
majority coalitions organized along other lines may fracture 
once Supreme Court reform is put on the table. Given huge ma-
jorities in both Houses of Congress and a landslide victory in 
1936,16 how could Roosevelt have failed to secure enactment of 
the court-packing plan? In a standard account, the New Deal 
coalition that had been created in and for the elections of 1932 
and 1936 splintered badly over the court-packing issue.17 In the 
latter election, Roosevelt had campaigned on a largely back-
ward-looking platform that asked for a national referendum on 
the first wave of New Deal reform.18 The issue of judicial re-
form was not raised.19 The court-packing plan of 1937 then split 
the Roosevelt coalition by introducing a new issue dimension.20 
Southern and western Democrats who supported the New Deal 
on other grounds were opposed to tampering with the Court.21 
 
 15. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the 
Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM 
LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 1, at 15; David J. Garrow, 
Mental Decrepitude on the U.S. Supreme Court: The Historical Case for a 28th 
Amendment, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 995 (2000). 
 16. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 4, at 132. 
 17. Id. at 158–59. 
 18. Id. at 107. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 158–59. 
 21. Id. 
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In general, conservative Democrats and Republicans found a 
common cause in opposing court packing.22 
Stipulating to the validity of this account, the important 
point is that it captures more than the happenstance of 1936 
and 1937. Generally speaking, reform of the Supreme Court is 
rarely a central organizing issue in national elections. The 
Court is just not that important when viewed in a larger per-
spective and compared to the bedrock issues of wages, taxes, 
housing, and other policies that do determine national political 
elections. Occasionally, as in 1968, the Court will come to be 
loosely associated with a national political issue, such as 
“crime,” but political platforms will be vague about what to do 
about the Court in order to paper over differences within the 
majority coalition. By and large, national coalitions must be or-
ganized on other issue dimensions, which means that they will 
be inherently unstable when reform of the Supreme Court be-
comes the central issue. The conditions that make Supreme 
Court reform possible—that a large national majority be organ-
ized—also tend to militate against the success of the reform 
proposal. The majority coalition will tend to come unglued 
when faced with the reform issue itself. 
So far, I have mentioned two possibilities. First, straight-
forwardly, a coalition may be organized around an issue and 
have intense preferences concerning that issue, as with the 
Roosevelt coalition and the New Deal economic program. Sec-
ond, as in the case of the court-packing plan, a coalition that is 
organized around one issue may fracture when faced with a dif-
ferent issue as to which coalition members have intense prefer-
ences in opposite directions. Thirdly, however, there is another 
important possibility: a coalition may be organized around one 
issue and, on a separate issue of court reform, hold only weak 
preferences or even be indifferent. In this scenario, reform is 
possible because the coalition’s leaders, elected on another pro-
gram, may seize the opportunity to implement reform if they 
happen to favor it, without fracturing their political base.23 
However, this is generally possible only with reform pro-
posals that provoke no strong opposition, which will also tend 
to be low-stakes proposals for marginal reforms. Where the 
governing coalition is indifferent about the reform because the 
benefit to them is small, but there is strong opposition because 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Thanks to Mark Tushnet for emphasizing this possibility. 
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the costs to others are high, leaders will be unable to mobilize 
enough support to secure enactment. More generally, the 
higher the stakes in a reform proposal, the more opposition it 
will tend to provoke. To be sure, reform can and does occur, but 
this tendency means that most of the reforms that do succeed 
will be marginal accomplishments. Consider in this regard the 
history of jurisdictional reform of the Court. Despite many pro-
posals for stripping the Court of jurisdiction over one policy 
area or another, no important jurisdiction-stripping measures 
have been enacted since Reconstruction.24 The important juris-
dictional changes that have occurred, such as the abolition of 
most of the Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction in 1925,25 
have uniformly expanded the Justices’ power and discretion. 
III.  THE PROBLEM OF THE OPTIMAL MAJORITY 
In this section, I turn to a more speculative account of the 
failure of the court-packing plan. It is obvious that a reform 
movement may fail because it commands no majority or com-
mands a majority that is too small; the foregoing account, 
based on the fracturing of the Democratic coalition, suggests 
that the rump of Roosevelt supporters was too small to over-
come the opposition. The problem of an excessively small ma-
jority, however, is matched by an equal and opposite problem: 
the majority favoring reform may also be too large. 
The first risk, that of an insufficient majority, is familiar. 
At the level of national public opinion, even a clear majority 
may fail to translate into a majority in national lawmaking in-
stitutions, given certain distributions of voters in a first-past-
the-post electoral system. Even if there exists a majority coali-
tion in Congress that is organized on the issue of judicial re-
 
 24. For an overview of jurisdiction-stripping proposals since Reconstruc-
tion, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 3.1 (4th ed. 2003) 
(noting that “few jurisdictional restrictions have been adopted thus far in 
American history”). It has been argued that, contrary to the conventional wis-
dom, jurisdiction stripping is common. See Dawn M. Chutkow, Jurisdiction 
Stripping: Ideology, Institutional Concerns, and Congressional Control of the 
Court 2 (Oct. 19, 2005) (unpublished working paper), available at http://papers 
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=828906. This thesis seems to depend 
upon an overly broad definition of jurisdiction stripping. Although it is difficult 
to be sure, the author’s definition seems to conflate jurisdiction stripping with 
preclusion of judicial review in the first instance and seemingly does not dis-
tinguish between cases of genuine jurisdiction stripping and cases in which 
Congress simply transferred jurisdiction from one court to another. 
 25. See Chutkow, supra note 24, at 2. 
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form—thus bracketing the problem of multidimensional poli-
tics—vetogates in the legislative process, including bicameral-
ism, congressional committees, and the filibuster, may allow 
minorities on the reform issue to block change. The puzzle of 
the court-packing episode, however, is that after the 1936 elec-
tion, Roosevelt held the presidency and partisan majorities in 
both Houses of Congress so large as to negate the threat of a 
partisan filibuster.26 On paper, the vetogates had already been 
unlocked, yet the reform plan failed ignominiously.27 
Crucially, the very size of the Roosevelt majority itself 
seems to have produced widespread public concern about the 
court-packing plan. In this perception, it suddenly became clear 
that Roosevelt effectively controlled the nonjudicial branches of 
government, that the narrow Court majority was one of the few 
remaining focal points for resistance to the New Deal program, 
and that a risk of executive tyranny had arisen.28 In the gen-
eral case, a majority that is too large may provoke a backlash 
by creating fears of untrammeled power among those who dis-
trust government in general or the executive in particular, and 
by increasing the underlying distrust itself. As Senator Henry 
Ashurst put it, “[e]ven many people who believe in President 
Roosevelt . . . were haunted by the terrible fear that some fu-
ture President might, by suddenly enlarging the Supreme 
Court, suppress free speech, free assembly, and invade other 
Constitutional guarantees of citizens.”29 
On this view, proposing a plan to enlarge the number of 
Justices played a crucial role in sharpening public concern 
about executive despotism generally and Roosevelt’s intentions 
in particular. Two factors may explain why this was so. The 
first is the “normative power of the factual.”30 The number of 
Justices had been set at nine since 1869, when the Reconstruc-
tion Congress increased the number from seven in order to give 
Ulysses S. Grant extra appointments.31 Such longstanding 
 
 26. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 4, at 132. 
 27. Actually, there were two reform plans, both of which failed. See Wil-
liam E. Leuchtenburg, FDR’s Court-Packing Plan: A Second Life, A Second 
Death, 1985 DUKE L.J. 673, 673. I touch upon the second plan in Part IV, in-
fra. 
 28. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 4, at 137. 
 29. Michael Nelson, The President and the Court: Reinterpreting the 
Court-Packing Episode of 1937, 103 POL. SCI. Q. 267, 276 (1988). 
 30. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 4, at 137–42. 
 31. Conversely, in 1866, Congress reduced the number of Justices from 
ten to seven in order to deny appointments to President Andrew Johnson. See 
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rules or invented traditions,32 whose dubious origin is usually 
lost in the mists of time, often come to seem normatively sig-
nificant. Although the number of Justices had been changed 
several times before, many believed that the Constitution speci-
fied nine. One writer encountered an elderly lady who pro-
tested, “If nine judges were enough for George Washington, 
they should be enough for President Roosevelt.”33 
The precise mechanisms that generate the normative 
power of the factual are as yet poorly understood; conjecturally, 
there is some relationship to the endowment effect, under 
which subjects value what they have more than what they 
lack,34 or to the phenomenon of status-quo bias.35 The norms 
that arise from institutional arrangements seen as longstand-
ing, however, tend to support an inference that actors who con-
travene such norms are untrustworthy. Partially informed pub-
lics or voters may use the following heuristic: any political actor 
who seeks to change the rules in the middle of the game is un-
trustworthy, presumptively motivated by partisan advantage or 
a desire for unchecked power. 
The second factor was a widespread perception that the 
court-packing plan was a disingenuous proposal.36 Although 
purportedly based on a concern about the competence of aging 
judges, the plan was widely seen as a gambit to increase the 
number of New Deal supporters on the Court.37 When it be-
came clear that the initial reaction to the plan was negative, 
Roosevelt tried to link the two issues, suggesting that anti-
quated judges would also have obsolete and socially harmful 
views.38 By that time, however, the damage had been done. 
 
 
ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 2 n.7 (7th ed. 1993). 
 32. See Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction to THE INVENTION OF TRADITION 1, 
1–4 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1983). 
 33. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 4, at 139. 
 34. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An 
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 277–80 (1979). 
 35. See, e.g., William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias 
in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1988). 
 36. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 4, at 138. 
 37. See id. 
 38. The famous fireside radio chat of March 9, 1937, is an example. See 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Radio Chat Defending the Plan to 
“Pack” the Supreme Court (March 9, 1937), in FDR’S FIRESIDE CHATS 83, 90 
(Russell D. Buhite & David W. Levy eds., 1992), available at http://www.hpol 
.org/fdr/chat. 
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This episode illustrates the dilemmas inherent in “the civi-
lizing force of hypocrisy.”39 Those who were unsure about the 
merits of the plan seem to have relied upon another political 
heuristic: that disingenuity implies bad motives. On this view, 
dictatorship was the real face behind the mask of the court-
packing plan. It does not follow, however, that the same voters 
would have seen Roosevelt as well motivated had he openly 
confessed to the goal of removing ideological opponents from 
the Court; that goal could in turn be condemned as partisan-
ship. Political actors are constrained to offer a public-regarding 
justification for reform, one that does not map too obviously 
onto their ideological views or partisan interests. Roosevelt 
failed by offering a plan that was too transparently motivated 
by other considerations, but sincerity about those other consid-
erations would not have improved the situation. 
Moreover, the constraint that one must offer a purportedly 
neutral criterion for reform was far from toothless; it actually 
caused Roosevelt to overshoot the mark set by his political in-
terests. Needing at most four more loyalist votes to gain control 
of the Court,40 Roosevelt offered a neutral principle, in the form 
 
 39. Jon Elster, Alchemies of the Mind: Transmutation and Misrepresenta-
tion, 3 LEGAL THEORY 133, 176 (1997). 
 40. In fact, there is a plausible case for picking any number from one to 
four as the magic number needed to gain control; which answer is correct de-
pends on how the question is specified. The simplistic argument for one is that 
many of the salient decisions invalidating New Deal programs (and similar 
state programs) before 1937 were issued by a vote of 5–4. See, e.g., Morehead 
v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 618 (1936) (finding a New York 
minimum wage law unconstitutional), overruled by Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. 
W. Reference & Bond Ass’n, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. 
Co., 295 U.S. 330, 374 (1935) (holding the Railroad Retirement Act unconstitu-
tional). But the Court was divided into three camps, not two. The Four 
Horsemen (Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler) were 
reliable anti-New Deal votes, whereas Justices Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo 
were reliable in the other direction. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 4, at 132–33. 
Justices Hughes and Roberts were, in the view of ardent New Dealers at least, 
unreliable weather vanes. Id. at 133. Even if one of the Horsemen were re-
placed with a Roosevelt loyalist, a coalition of Hughes, Roberts, and the re-
maining three Horsemen could still defeat New Deal programs by a 5–4 vote. 
Assuming a Court with a constant membership of nine, Roosevelt needed two 
new appointments to be certain of success. However, if new appointments 
were additions rather than replacements, no less than three appointments 
would be necessary to ensure a 6–6 tie (which would become a 7–5 majority 
whenever either of the two waverers joined the liberals), while four appoint-
ments would be necessary to ensure a 7–6 victory. Under any scenario, how-
ever, six new appointments would be excessive, so the criterion Roosevelt of-
fered overshot the mark. 
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of an age cutoff of 70,41 that would have given him no less than 
six additional appointments. With an age cutoff of 75, only five 
more seats would have been added,42 but that figure would 
have made the plan appear even more obviously pretextual. 
Because three Justices were clumped at age 75, it was not pos-
sible to propose a cutoff that would have given Roosevelt ex-
actly four more appointments. Even were such a criterion pos-
sible, however, it would have been so precisely tailored to 
Roosevelt’s interests as to be suspicious in its own right. The 
overshooting plausibly contributed to the impression that Roo-
sevelt sought dictatorial powers. On the other hand, the 70-
year figure was a neutral-seeming round number and had the 
political advantage of using the civilizing force of hypocrisy as a 
sword: Roosevelt’s most intractable opponent among the 
Horsemen, Justice McReynolds, had at an earlier time himself 
proposed a retirement age of 70 for all federal judges.43 
The puzzle for this whole line of explanation is why the 
same voters, or a decisive fraction of the same voters, who sup-
ported Roosevelt and congressional Democrats in the 1936 elec-
tion would react against Roosevelt’s large majority after the 
fact. The multidimensional character of coalition politics would 
supply an answer to this, but we are assuming away that issue 
here. Assuming, counterfactually, that the 1936 election had 
been organized as a referendum on the courts, why would ex 
ante supporters of the New Deal become opponents of Roose-
veltian tyranny ex post? 
I conjecture that the striking turnabout occurred because 
electoral decisions are uncoordinated. Rational voters, condi-
tional on having entered the voting booth, vote expressively 
rather than instrumentally.44 (I bracket here the well-known 
 
 41. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 4, at 134. 
 42. On February 5, 1937, the date of the plan’s formal introduction, see 
CUSHMAN, supra note 8, at 11, the ages of the Justices were 80 (Brandeis); 77 
(Van Devanter); 75 (Hughes, McReynolds, and Sutherland); 70 (Butler); 66 
(Cardozo); 64 (Stone); and 61 (Roberts). See generally ALPHEUS THOMAS MA-
SON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 11 (1956); 3 THE JUSTICES OF 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 
(Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1997). Ignoring Hughes and Roberts as 
unpredictable, any cutoff less than 71 and greater than 66 would maximize 
the difference between the number of conservatives covered (four) and the 
number of liberals covered (one). However, a cutoff at age 70 also possessed 
the other benefits discussed in text. 
 43. See William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
“Court-Packing” Plan, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 347, 391–92. 
 44. See GEOFFREY BRENNAN & LOREN LOMASKY, DEMOCRACY AND DECI-
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prior puzzle of why rational people would vote in the first 
place.) Any particular individual voter or group of voters, if as-
sured of being the decisive voter, might prefer a division of par-
tisan power across national lawmaking institutions, including 
the Supreme Court. Given that any individual voting decision 
has effectively zero chance of being decisive, however, voters 
will indulge expressive statements of loyalty—to Roosevelt or to 
the Democratic party—that are effectively costless. Once ap-
praised that other voters have done likewise, however, the very 
voters who supported Roosevelt and the congressional Democ-
rats seem to have become concerned that the collective outcome 
of uncoordinated choices had produced total Rooseveltian 
dominance of the national government. 
The upshot of all this is that reform proposals need an op-
timal majority to succeed—one that is neither too large nor too 
small. In the court-packing episode, the political conditions that 
produced a sufficient congressional majority to unlock the veto-
gates and surmount the hurdles of the lawmaking process also 
caused the reform movement to overshoot the mark, producing 
a backlash animated by fear of executive tyranny. The very fac-
tors that made reform possible also produced counterforces that 
blocked its accomplishment. Again, this is only to identify a 
mechanism that tends to block reform, not an iron law that re-
form can never succeed. In some cases, reform proposals can 
slip between Scylla and Charybdis; the Reconstruction-era 
changes to the Court’s composition are an example.45 In gen-
eral, however, it is much more likely that any given proposal 
will be sucked into the whirlpool of vetogates or swallowed up 
in a political backlash against an excessive majority. 
IV.  THE VEIL OF UNCERTAINTY, DELAY,  
AND MOTIVATION 
A standard idea in constitutional design is that less infor-
mation can be better than more. Depriving political actors of 
information about how to promote their narrow self-interest 
will cause them to behave as though animated by impartial mo-
tives. The veil of ignorance,46 or uncertainty,47 subjects decision 
 
SION: THE PURE THEORY OF ELECTORAL PREFERENCE 32–53 (1993). 
 45. In 1866, Congress reduced the number of Justices from ten to seven, 
in order to deny appointments to President Andrew Johnson. See STERN ET 
AL., supra note 31, at 2 n.7. 
 46. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118–23 (rev. ed. 1999). 
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makers to uncertainty about the distribution of benefits and 
burdens that will result from a decision. This distributive un-
certainty can take one of two basic forms. In the Rawlsian veil 
of ignorance, decision makers are placed under a constraint of 
ignorance about their own identities and attributes.48 This in-
troduces uncertainty by allowing the decision maker to know 
the distributive consequences of a decision across citizens—call 
them A and B—but denying the decision maker the knowledge 
of whether she herself occupies A’s position or B’s position. The 
more common and less radical version, however, is the veil of 
uncertainty.49 Although the relevant decision makers know 
their own current identities and interests, the veil introduces 
uncertainty about who will reap the greater gains from the de-
cision.50 
How is the veil of uncertainty produced? One technique is 
to enact reforms at a certain time that will not take effect until 
a later time, perhaps years or even decades hence.51 Delay 
takes advantage of a preexisting uncertainty, the inherent un-
predictability of the decision makers’ long-term interests, that 
would otherwise be overwhelmed by the incentives to focus on 
short-term considerations.52 By confining the decision’s applica-
tion to the remote future in which decision makers’ interests 
are unpredictable, a delay rule ensures that the only period 
current decision makers can affect is one that is, from their ex 
ante standpoint, subject to a veil of uncertainty.53 
By diluting current decision makers’ ability to assess 
where their own interests lie, delayed enactments might be 
thought to ease the path of reform. One might imagine a vari-
ant of Roosevelt’s proposal in which the legislation, although 
 
 47. See GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE REASON OF 
RULES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 30 (1985); John C. Harsanyi, 
Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of 
Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309 (1955). 
 48. See RAWLS, supra note 46, at 118–19. 
 49. Harsanyi, supra note 47. 
 50. See id. 
 51. For discussion of “delayed-effect” rules, see Ariel Porat & Omri Yadlin, 
Promoting Consensus In Society Through Deferred-Implementation Agree-
ments, 56 U. TORONTO L.J. (forthcoming 2006), available at http://law.bepress 
.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=taulwps; Adrian Vermeule, 
Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 399, 419–24 
(2001). 
 52. Vermeule, supra note 51, at 419–20. 
 53. Id. 
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enacted now, would not take effect until after the 1940 elec-
tion.54 In the general case, delayed implementation might buy 
off the opposition that would otherwise be offered by political 
actors whose interests would be harmed by a proposal with 
immediate effect. In a similar vein, Paul Carrington and Roger 
Cramton’s recent proposal for reforming the Justices’ tenure to 
a fixed term of years55 in effect delays the proposal’s onset date 
by grandfathering currently sitting Justices. The grandfather-
ing presumably buys off self-interested opposition on the part of 
sitting Justices.56 
In fact, however, successful delayed enactments are quite 
rare. A major reason is the basic trade-off between impartiality 
and motivation.57 Delay may buy off opposition, but it also 
eliminates the short-term, self-interested benefit that would 
accrue to the political actors who would otherwise support the 
proposal and incur the costs of shepherding it through the leg-
islative process. Delay replaces self-interested motivation with 
impartial reason, but the latter motivation is frequently too 
feeble to produce action; the pallid claims of reason rarely pro-
voke the same degree of energy and activity as the prospect of 
self-interested gain. In general, the high opportunity costs of 
political action, constricted agenda space in Congress, sharp 
limits on the amount of time the executive can spend on any 
one project, the horizon of reelection, and the tendency to dis-
count the future, all push political actors to rank projects by 
the degree of benefit they produce in the near term. Projects 
that will produce large collective benefits in the long run, but 
whose distributive valence is uncertain, will be subordinated to 
projects that produce larger factional benefits in the short run. 
In the case of Roosevelt, a court-packing plan with a delayed 
effective date would not have advanced Roosevelt’s immediate 
 
 54. In fact, Roosevelt’s second court-packing plan embodied a partial de-
lay mechanism. It authorized the President to “appoint an additional Justice 
per calendar year for each member of the Supreme Court who remained on the 
bench after the age of seventy-five.” LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 4, at 148. 
Given the distribution of the Justices’ ages, “the bill would empower [Roose-
velt] to name four new Justices, as well as a Justice to fill the Van Devanter 
vacancy, but the total of five could not be reached until the beginning of 1940.” 
Id. 
 55. See Carrington & Cramton, supra note 1. 
 56. This is my interpretation of the proposal’s effect; I do not assert that 
Carrington and Cramton intend this effect. 
 57. For other explanations, see Porat & Yadlin, supra note 51, manuscript 
at 29–34. 
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goal of clearing judicial obstruction to New Deal programs. In 
the case of the Carrington and Cramton proposal, the safe pre-
diction is that it will never be enacted. The delayed onset of the 
proposal makes its political valence uncertain, which in turn 
means that no current political actor will be strongly motivated 
to shoulder the burdens of enactment. Political action oriented 
toward the long run tends to occur only where the political va-
lence of the proposal is clear ex ante, as in proposals for envi-
ronmental regulation with long-term effects. 
Overall, the trade-off between impartiality and motivation 
creates another Scylla and Charybdis through which reform 
proposals must slip. On the one hand, stipulating that a pro-
posal should have a delayed effective date helps to remove the 
taint of self-interested or partisan motives and avoids trigger-
ing the heuristic that one should not try to change the rules in 
the middle of the game. On the other hand, delaying the pro-
posal’s effect means that concrete problems of the here and 
now, the sort of problems most likely to motivate reform, can-
not be addressed. The delaying tactic makes reform possible by 
creating an appearance of impartiality and buying off current 
opposition, but the tactic also makes the reform less likely to be 
proposed and pursued. Conversely, the short-term interest that 
motivates reform itself tends to create self-limiting political 
constraints. Proposals that produce short-term benefits for par-
ticular groups will attract motivated supporters but will also 
provoke opposition. 
V.  CRISIS, REFORM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENTS 
In this section, I will briefly generalize some of the forego-
ing points. A standard idea is that political constraints limit in-
stitutional reform until some exogenous shock creates a crisis 
that destabilizes extant institutions.58 The resulting uncer-
tainty can promote reform, as previously discussed. Exogenous 
shocks or crises, however, are a necessary but insufficient con-
dition for reform. This is because crisis has two effects pulling 
in opposite directions: crisis destabilizes institutions, but it also 
tends to create new political constraints that shore up those in-
stitutions against change. As relevant here, times of crisis both 
increase the demand for Supreme Court reform and also tend 
 
 58. See, e.g., THRAINN EGGERTSSON, IMPERFECT INSTITUTIONS: POSSIBILI-
TIES AND LIMITS OF REFORM 152–73 (2005). 
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to create political obstacles to that reform. For concreteness, I 
focus on a dilemma that plagued Roosevelt: should reform of 
the Court be attempted through the process of constitutional 
amendment or through the legislative process? The latter path 
better suits the conditions of urgency that give rise to the de-
mand for reform yet also creates an appearance of partisan 
manipulation. The former path seems more suitable for struc-
tural reform yet may take too long to be an effective response to 
a crisis. 
Roosevelt and his advisers ultimately chose the legislative 
path, in large part because they feared that the amendment 
process would unduly delay reform. The sense of national eco-
nomic crisis that gave rise to the New Deal agenda also implied 
that immediate action was necessary. As Attorney General 
Homer Cummings said, “[t]he Administration cannot very well 
let its social program bog down because of adverse Supreme 
Court decisions, and, on the other hand, the delays incident to 
amendment are rather appalling.”59 However, the decision to 
proceed legislatively also created or strengthened opposition to 
the substance of the reform proposal. 
In 1937, opponents of Roosevelt’s proposal for statutory 
court reform fell into three camps. Some flatly opposed the con-
tent of the proposal, whatever its legal form.60 Others said that 
the proposal should not or could not be enacted legislatively, 
but could and should be enacted as a constitutional amend-
ment.61 Within the latter group, we may distinguish those who 
held their position in bad faith from those who held it in good 
faith. Roosevelt suspected pervasive bad faith, saying that “the 
same forces which are now calling for the amendment process 
would turn around and fight ratification on the simple ground 
that they do not like the particular amendment adopted by the 
Congress.”62 However, the bill was also opposed by some, such 
as Senator George Norris, who genuinely favored the substance 
 
 59. Kyvig, supra note 9, at 476 (quoting Diary of Homer Cummings, At-
torney Gen. (Nov. 15, 1936)). The delay might not have been as protracted as 
the New Dealers feared, see id. at 479, but the fear was certainly reasonable in 
light of the salient example of the 1924 Child Labor Amendment, which was 
still unratified as of 1937 (and which eventually failed). See id. at 479 & n.68. 
 60. Cf. id. at 466 (discussing the battle that ensued after Roosevelt an-
nounced his plan to reorganize the judiciary). 
 61. See id. at 467. 
 62. Id. at 477 (quoting Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt, President, 
United States of America, to Charles Burlingham (Feb. 23, 1937)). 
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of the proposal but who also genuinely thought that constitu-
tional amendment was the proper path.63 
The rationale for the last position was never clearly stated. 
Although an amendment would be necessary if the bill were 
unconstitutional, the arguments to that effect were quite weak 
given the Reconstruction precedents in which Congress had 
manipulated the number of Justices at will.64 In any event, the 
principal concerns motivating good-faith opposition to the 
statutory path seem to have been nonlegal. Norris worried that 
anything short of an amendment would “plague our descen-
dants” because “it does not strike permanently at the evil we 
want to remedy.”65 As suggested above, this concern applies 
even more strongly to nonstructural reform accomplished by 
constraining the Justices to execute a switch in time. Another, 
vaguer intuition seems to have been that it was inherently 
more suitable to pursue structural reform of the judiciary by 
amendment rather than by statute. The intuition, similar to 
the heuristics described above, is that changing the rules of the 
judicial game by legislation is an attack on the referee by one of 
the players, and thus presumptively arises from partisan or 
self-interested motivations. 
Overall, the choice of legal instruments for judicial reform 
presented Roosevelt and his advisers with a dilemma. On the 
one hand, the New Dealers knew from personal experience that 
“[d]emands for . . . constitutional revision tend to arise in times 
of crisis in which waiting is an unaffordable luxury.”66 The cri-
sis that produced the demand for reform also constrained the 
choice between available paths to reform by ruling out the more 
protracted amendment process. On the other hand, the statu-
tory avenue itself provoked political opposition that would not 
otherwise have arisen. That opposition came both from bad-
faith opponents who were enabled to argue for the amendment 
path—and were thus given an extra arrow for their rhetorical 
quivers—and also from good-faith opponents, whose preference 
for the amendment path put them in unwilling coalition with 
the bad-faith opponents. The very crisis that produced the de-
 
 63. See id. at 480. 
 64. See, e.g., STERN ET AL., supra note 31, at 2 n.7 (discussing Congress’s 
reduction of the number of Justices from ten to seven to deny appointments to 
President Johnson). 
 65. Kyvig, supra note 9, at 480. 
 66. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOM-
MITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 145 (2000). 
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mand for reform by constraining the feasible paths to reform 
also produced endogenous opposition to the alternative path. In 
this sense, the impetus to Supreme Court reform that arose out 
of the New Deal crisis had a self-negating tendency. 
Again, this conjunction of forces and counterforces is not 
inevitable. Occasionally, reform will slip through because there 
is an evident structural problem, because all concerned are un-
certain about the future effects of the reform, and because no 
group will lose much from current enactment. The constitu-
tional amendments that have restructured presidential succes-
sion may count as an example.67 In general, however, such a 
constellation of happy circumstances is both fortuitous and 
rare. Structural reform, especially of the Court, is systemati-
cally unlikely and unreliable. 
CONCLUSION 
I have suggested a range of mechanisms that systemati-
cally tend to make Supreme Court reform a self-negating en-
terprise. The very conditions that give rise to the demand for 
reform also tend to create political constraints on reform. 
Whether valid or not, this thesis would be relevant from the 
standpoint of the external analyst, such as the academic social 
scientist. I hasten to add, however, that the shape of the politi-
cally feasible set is not obviously a relevant consideration for 
practical advocates of reform (who may also happen to hold 
academic posts). A plausible division of labor is that the re-
former should deliberately ignore political feasibility; she 
should simply propose first-best plans and programs and then 
let politics itself filter the feasible from the infeasible. The re-
former is typically an expert in the substantive area at hand, 
not in politics, so self-censoring in light of the reformer’s esti-
mate of political feasibility carries the risk that the reformer 
will mistakenly filter out an ideal solution that would actually 
have been enacted. By contrast, the opposite error—the pro-
posal of ideal solutions that are politically infeasible—is solved 
automatically by the operation of the political filter. For these 
reasons, reform proposals such as that offered by Carrington 
and Cramton are socially very valuable, even if, from the ana-
lyst’s standpoint, they are systematically likely to fail. 
 
 67. See U.S. CONST. amends. XX, XXV. 
